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Abstract
We present a new class of games, local-effect
games (LEGs), which exploit structure in a differ-
ent way from other compact game representations
studied in AI. We show both theoretically and em-
pirically that these games often (but not always)
have pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Finding a po-
tential function is a good technique for finding such
equilibria. We give a complete characterization
of which LEGs have potential functions and pro-
vide the functions in each case; we also show a
general case where pure-strategy equilibria exist in
the absence of potential functions. In experiments,
we show that myopic best-response dynamics con-
verge quickly to pure strategy equilibria in games
not covered by our positive theoretical results.
1 Introduction
Games have long been studied in AI as a model of compet-
itive multiagent interactions. In particular, many researchers
in AI have been interested in finding Nash equilibria (c.f. [5;
2]; for an introduction to games and equilibrium concepts, see
e.g. [3]). Recently, there has been a lot of work on compact
representations of games with large numbers of players, and
games for which the computation of equilibria is tractable [8;
15; 6; 7; 14; 9]. Much work in this vein has been based
on the exploitation of one of two kinds of locality. First,
some approaches exploit unconditional independencies be-
tween players’ abilities to affect each other’s payoffs [8; 15;
6; 1]. Second, some approaches exploit symmetry in util-
ity functions along with context-specific independencies be-
tween players’ effects on each other; more precisely, games in
which players’ abilities to affect each other depend on the ac-
tions they choose. Here we study games in this second class,
because we believe that this sort of context-specific indepen-
dence is more common in real-world games.
Although compact representation has not been a primary
motivation for economists, some work from economics does
fall into the framework defined above. Most influentially,
Rosenthal defined congestion games [13]. In these games
each agent i selects a subset Si from an available set of re-
sources R; where nr is the number of agents who choose
resource r ∈ R, and Fr are arbitrary functions for each r,
agent i pays:
pi(Si, n) =
∑
r∈S
Fr(nr) (1)
Observe that agent payoffs exhibit no unconditional inde-
pendencies: all agents are given the same action choices,
and so all agents can affect each other’s payoffs. On the
other hand, context-specific independence does exist when
two agents choose non-intersecting resource subsets. Rosen-
thal’s main result in [13] was that congestion games always
have pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) . This is important
because, although all games have mixed-strategy Nash equi-
libria [11], there are few known classes of interesting games
with pure strategy equilibria. At the same time, pure strategy
equilibria are attractive: they can be more likely to arise in
play as they are more intuitive than mixed-strategy equilibria
for many players; they can be easier for agents to coordinate
to; as there are a finite number of pure strategy profiles in a
given game, they can be easier to compute than mixed strat-
egy equilibria.
Rosenthal’s work was extended by Monderer and Shapley
[10], who showed that the class of congestion games is equiv-
alent to the class of games with potential functions. Potential
functions map agents’ joint actions to a real number, with the
property that if X and Y are strategy profiles differing only
in the action choice of one agent i, P (X) − P (Y ) is equal
to the difference in i’s payoff from selecting the two actions.
This result is useful because it means that the construction
of a potential function is sufficient for showing the existence
of a pure-strategy equilibrium. Potential functions can also
be used to compute equilibria: the set of pure-strategy Nash
equilibria is equivalent to the set of strategy profiles that max-
imize P .
Recent work in computer science and AI has explored
classes of games inspired by and extending congestion
games. For example, Kearns et al. examined games with
bounded effects [7], and Roughgarden studied a nonatomic
variant [14]. In this paper we propose a new class, which we
call local-effect games.
2 Local-Effect Games
In congestion games, whenever two agents affect each other’s
payoff, they each do so by the same amount. Local-effect
games (LEGs) model situations where agents’ effects on each
other are potentially asymmetric. Generally, action A locally
affects action B if the utility of agents taking action B de-
pends on some function FA,B of the number of agents taking
action A, but the utility of agents taking action A depends
on a different function FB,A of the number of agents taking
action B.
There are many natural settings which are modeled by such
locally-effecting actions. One problem domain that has been
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studied in Economics for a three quarters of a century is
the location problem [4]. These problems model situations
where agents must choose a location to operate their busi-
ness in the presence of other competing agents, and each
agent’s profit depends on how far she is from her competi-
tors. The canonical example concerns ice cream vendors
who must choose a spot on the beach to set up a kiosk, with
agents’ utility depending on how many other ice cream sell-
ers have located themselves in the same or adjacent areas.
Work from Economics on this problem has usually dealt with
one-dimensional continuous spaces and has not modeled lo-
cal effects explicitly; also, game theoretic analyses have typ-
ically considered only a small (e.g. 2 or 3) number of agents
(c.f. [12]). It is easy to think of many variants on the loca-
tion problem: ice cream sellers arranging themselves around
a lake (ring structure); vendors opening coffee houses in a
city (grid structure); pairs at a cocktail party trying to pick
a quiet room, with noise proportional to the number of peo-
ple in the room, and noise also emanating from nearby rooms
(arbitrary structure).
Another natural domain modeled by LEGs is a role forma-
tion game, where agents can take on one of a set of partially-
substitutable roles. Agents are rewarded according to the
amount of work they do, so their payoff is reduced as other
agents adopt the same or similar roles.
Formally, let G = 〈A,F , n〉 be a local-effect game for n
agents. A is the set of actions available to each player in the
game. Let D denote the distribution of players across actions,
and D(a) denote the number of players who chose action a ∈
A. For every pair of actions a, a′ ∈ A, Fa,a′ : Z+ → R+
is the cost function expressing the cost due to the local effect
from action a to action a′, and depending on the number of
agents having chosen action a. From this we can build the
cost function of an agent a who chose action i ∈ A:
cost(a) = Fi,i(D(i)) +
∑
j∈A,j =i
Fj,i(D(j)). (2)
We assume that in all local-effect games F is strictly
monotonic: that ∀a, a′ = a ∈ A Fa,a′(x) either increases
strictly monotonically with x or is always 0. Furthermore we
assume ∀a, a′ = a ∈ A Fa,a′(0) = 0.
It is useful to think of a directed graph representing the ac-
tions and their local effects. We create a node for every action,
and draw an edge from node i to node j if ∀xFi,j(x) = 0 is
false. We will sometimes denote functions of the formFi,i(x)
as node functions, and functions of the form Fi,j(x), i = j as
edge functions. Let neigh(i) denote the set of nodes to which
there are directed edges originating at node i.
We make one assumption about this graph’s connectivity:
∀A,B ∈ A, B ∈ neigh(A) → A ∈ neigh(B). (3)
That is, each pair of nodes in the graph are either both or
neither neighbors of each other, though they might influence
each other according to different local-effect functions.
Definition 1 A local-effect game is a bidirectional local-
effect game (B-LEG) when ∀a ∈ A,∀a′ = a ∈
AFa,a′(x) = Fa′,a(x).
For B-LEGs local-effect functions between pairs of actions
are always the same in both directions; note however that for
a given distribution of agents the magnitude of the local ef-
fects between a pair of actions may be different. The graph-
ical representation of actions and local effects in B-LEGs is
undirected.
Definition 2 A local-effect game is a uniform local-effect
game (U-LEG) when ∀A,B,C ∈ A (B ∈ neigh(A) ∧ C ∈
neigh(A)) → ∀xFA,B(x) = FA,C(x).
That is, if action A has any effect on nodes B and C then
the same function governs its effect on both. We define nota-
tion for the uniform effect from node A: FuA(x) = FA,·(x).
3 Theoretical Results
3.1 Nonexistence of Pure Strategy Equilibria
Rosenthal was able to show that congestion games always
have a PSNE. For local-effect games, we can find counter-
examples where exhaustive enumeration of strategies shows
the absence of any PSNE, demonstrating that such a sweep-
ing general result is impossible. One example (found ex-
perimentally, and confirmed by exhaustive search) is the B-
LEG G = 〈{A,B,C},F , 11〉, with FA,A(x) = 2.79x,
FB,B(x) = 4.72x, FC,C(x) = 1.5x, FA,B(x) = 0.64 log x,
FA,C(x) = 0.32 log x, FB,C(x) = 2.77 log x.
3.2 Pure Strategy Equilibria: Potential Functions
In this section we show that two interesting classes of local-
effect games have potential functions, meaning that they al-
ways have pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Although these re-
sults show regions of overlap between the class of conges-
tion games and the class of local-effect games, the potential
functions themselves are interesting as their construction is
nontrivial. Also, these results are useful because they make
it possible for the games to be described in the more intuitive
local-effect game framework.
Theorem 1 Bidirectional local-effect games have pure strat-
egy Nash equilibria if ∀i, ∀j = iFi,j(x) = mi,jx.
Sketch of Proof. Here we prove the result by giving a
potential function:
P =
n∑
i=1
D(i)∑
j=1
Fi,i(j) + 12
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈neigh(i)
D(i)mj,iD(j) (4)
The first term is the standard congestion game potential
function. A game with only functions of the form Fi,i(x) is a
congestion game, and so must have the congestion game po-
tential function. The relationship between each Fi,j(x) func-
tion and the agent’s cost function is additive, and potential
functions are only used for taking differences. Thus if we
can find a potential function P ′ for a game with only local
effects and all Fi,i(x) = 0, the potential function for a gen-
eral B-LEG will be the sum of the congestion game potential
function and P ′.
Thus it remains to argue that our second term is this P ′:
that it captures changes in utility arising from local effects.
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Consider the sum of the contribution of local effects to each
agent’s utility: s =
∑n
i=1
∑
j∈neigh(i) D(i)mj,iD(j). When
a single agent a deviates, s increases by twice the amount of
the change to a’s utility, because all Fi,j(x) are linear and
bidirectional. That is, there is a change both in the amount
of local effect acting on agent a, and new local effect caused
by agent a, and bidirectionality and linearity imply that these
two amounts are the same. Thus the desired result is obtained
by adding 12s to the congestion game potential function. 
Observe that Theorem 1 holds for B-LEGs with non-linear
functions Fi,i(x)—what is required is linearity of the local-
effect functions.
Theorem 2 Uniform local-effect games have pure strategy
Nash equilibria if the local-effect graph is a clique.
Sketch of Proof. Again we provide a potential function:
P =
n∑
i=1
D(i)∑
j=1
Fi,i(j)−
n∑
i=1
D(i)−1∑
j=1
Fui (j) (5)
As argued in Theorem 1, to construct a potential function
it is sufficient to add the standard congestion game potential
function with a function that accounts for changes in utility
due to local effects. This explains the first term.
Let distributions X and Y be identical except that
DX(A) = α and DX(B) = β, while DY (A) = α − 1
and DY (B) = β + 1. Assuming FA,A(·) = FB,B(·) = 0,
P (X)− P (Y ) = FuB(β)−FuA(α− 1). This is precisely the
change in utility for an agent deviating from A in X to B in
Y : the agent will be spared the local effect FuB(β) since he
moves to B and is no longer subject to its local effect; how-
ever, since he moves away from A and the graph is a clique,
he is now subject to the local effect FuA(α − 1). Because the
graph is a clique, and because the game is a U-LEG, the ar-
gument holds no matter which pair of nodes is chosen as A
and B. 
3.3 LEGs and Potential Functions
Finding potential functions is an effective way of proving the
existence of pure-strategy equilibria; however, there are many
LEGs for which potential functions can be shown not to exist.
In this section we give a complete characterization of the class
of LEGs which have potential functions.
Lemma 1 A local-effect game has a potential function if
∀a, a′ ∈ AFa,a′(·) = 0.
Sketch of Proof. Trivially, a LEG without any local effects
is a congestion game. 
Lemma 2 The class of potential games does not contain
the class of local-effect games for which ∃A,B,C ∈ A
where B ∈ neigh(C) and not A ∈ neigh(B) and not
A ∈ neigh(C) and (FB,C = FC,B or FB,C is nonlinear).
Sketch of Proof. Assume for contradiction that every LEG
in the class has a potential function P . We will consider
three distributions of agents in order to derive properties of
P . Without loss of generality, we take A,B and C to be the
first three actions in the game, and we take the total number of
actions to be n. For more compact notation in what follows,
let α = D(A), β = D(B) and γ = D(C). Define the follow-
ing three distributions: X = (α, β, γ,D(4), . . . ,D(n)), Y =
(α − 1, β + 1, γ,D(4), . . . ,D(n)) and Z = (α, β + 1, γ −
1,D(4), . . . ,D(n)). Without making any assumptions about
the local effects between actions A,B and C and any of the
other n− 3 actions, and for x ∈ {A,B,C}, let:
Ux(D(x),D(4), . . . ,D(n))
= Fx,x(D(x)) +
∑
a′∈{4,...,n}
Fa′,a(D(a′)) (6)
That is, Ux(D(x),D(4), . . . ,D(n)) denotes the (negative)
utility contributed to each agent taking action x ∈ {A,B,C}
by those agents also taking action x, and by those agents tak-
ing the 4th through nth actions. For compactness we will ab-
breviate Ux(D(x),D(4), . . . ,D(n)) as ux(D(x)) below.
If distribution X were the case and an agent playing action
A switched to action B, then distribution Y would be the
result. Thus:
P (X)− P (Y ) = [uA(α)]− [FC,B(γ) + uB(β + 1)] (7)
If X were the case and an agent playing action C switched
to action B, then Z would be the result. Thus:
P (X)−P (Z) = [FB,C(β)+uC(γ)]−[FC,B(γ−1)+uB(β+1)]
(8)
If Y were the case and an agent playing action C switched
to action A, then Z would be the result. Thus:
P (Y )− P (Z) = [FB,C(β + 1) + uC(γ)]− [uA(α)] (9)
From equations (7) and (8), we can infer:
P (Y )− P (Z) = P (Y )− P (Z) + [P (X)− P (X)]
= [P (X)− P (Z)]− [P (X)− P (Y )]
=
[
[FB,C(β) + uC(γ)]− [FC,B(γ − 1)
+ uB(β + 1)]
]−[[uA(α)]
− [FC,B(γ) + uB(β + 1)]
]
(10)
Intersect equation (10) with equation (9) and rearrange.
Observe that uA(α), uB(β + 1) and uC(γ) all cancel out,
demonstrating that this proof does not depend on what edges
exist between A,B,C and the rest of the graph, or on node
effects. Define Ia,a′(x) = Fa,a′(x) − Fa,a′(x − 1): the in-
cremental cost on the local effect between a and a′ of adding
the xth agent to a. We then get:
IC,B(γ)− IB,C(β + 1) = 0 (11)
Clearly, equation (11) will not be satisfied for all β, γ un-
less FB,C = FC,B and FB,C is linear. This contradicts our
assumption that a potential function exists for every LEG in
the class. 
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Lemma 3 The class of potential games does not contain the
class of local-effect games for which ∃A,B,C ∈ A where
B ∈ neigh(C) and A ∈ neigh(B) and not A ∈ neigh(C)
and (FB,C = FC,B or FB,C is nonlinear or FA,B = FB,A
or FA,B is nonlinear).
Sketch of Proof. This proof follows the proof of Lemma 2
and uses the same setting and definitions, except that (as
stated in the theorem) A ∈ neigh(B). Using the same ar-
guments about distributions X,Y and Z we can derive:
[IC,B(γ)−IB,C(β+1)
]
+
[IB,A(β+1)−IA,B(α)
]
= 0
(12)
Clearly, equation (12) will not be satisfied for all α, β, γ
unless FA,B = FB,A,FB,C = FC,B , and both FA,B and
FB,C are linear. This contradicts our assumption that a po-
tential function exists for every LEG in the class. 
Lemma 4 The class of potential games does not contain the
class of local-effect games for which ∃A,B,C ∈ A where
B ∈ neigh(C) and A ∈ neigh(B) and A ∈ neigh(C) and
(FB,C = FC,B or FB,C is nonlinear or FA,B = FB,A or
FA,B is nonlinear or FA,C = FC,A or FA,C is nonlinear)
and (FA,B = FA,C or FB,A = FB,C or FC,A = FC,B).
Sketch of Proof. This proof follows the proof of Lemmas
2 and 3 and uses the same setting and definitions, except that
(as stated in the theorem) A ∈ neigh(B) and A ∈ neigh(C).
Using the same arguments about distributions X,Y and Z we
can derive:
[IA,C(α)− IA,B(α)
]
+
[IB,A(β + 1)− IB,C(β + 1)
]
+
[IC,B(γ)− IC,A(γ)
]
= 0 (13)
Equation (13) may be rewritten as:
[IA,C(α)− IC,A(γ)
]
+
[IB,A(β + 1)− IA,B(α)
]
+
[IC,B(γ)− IB,C(β + 1)
]
= 0 (14)
From equation (13) we can see that the contradiction does
not obtain for all α, β, γ whenFA,B = FA,C ,FB,A = FB,C ,
and FC,A = FC,B . From equation (14) we can see that the
contradiction does not obtain for all α, beta, γ when FA,B =
FB,A,FB,C = FC,B ,FA,C = FC,A and FA,B ,FA,C and
FB,C are all linear. If neither condition holds, our assump-
tion a potential function exists for every LEG in the class is
contradicted. 
We can now completely characterize those classes of LEGs
that have potential functions.
Theorem 3 The class of potential games contains the class
of local-effect games for which any of the following hold:
1. the local-effect graph contains fewer than three nodes
2. the local-effect graph contains no edges
3. the game is a bidirectional local-effect game and all
local-effect functions are linear
4. the game is a uniform local-effect game and the local-
effect graph is a clique
No other local-effect games have potential functions.
Sketch of Proof. First, it is clear that a game with only
a single action has a potential function. A LEG with only
two actions is trivially a U-LEG and has a local-effect graph
which is a clique, so by Theorem 2 it has a potential function.
This proves statement 1 in the theorem, and leaves us to con-
sider LEGs which have 3 or more actions. We will do a case
analysis considering all possible local-effect graph structures
for these LEGs. Clearly, all graphs with 3 or more nodes are
included if we consider all graphs with no edges, all cliques,
and all graphs containing subgraphs having three nodes and
either exactly one or exactly two edges.
Lemma 1 proves that if the local-effect graph has no edges
then the LEG is a congestion game, proving statement 2.
If the local-effect graph contains a subgraph with three
nodes and exactly one edge, and is not a B-LEG with linear
functions, Lemma 2 shows that it does not have a potential
function. If it is a B-LEG with linear functions, Theorem 1
shows that it has a potential function, proving statement 3.
If the local-effect graph contains a subgraph with three
nodes and exactly two edges, and is not a B-LEG with linear
functions (again, statement 3), Lemma 3 shows that it does
not have a potential function.
If the local-effect graph is a clique, it contains a a clique
of size three as a subgraph. If the graph is not a U-LEG,
Lemma 4 shows that it does not have a potential function. If
it is a U-LEG, Theorem 2 shows that it does have a potential
function, proving statement 4. 
3.4 Other Pure-Strategy Equilibria
We are also able to prove the existence of pure-strategy Nash
equilibria for classes of graphs, and node and edge functions
that Theorem 3 shows cannot have potential functions. The
following constructive proof has classes of B-LEGs and U-
LEGs as special cases:
Theorem 4 If a local-effect game satisfies
1. ∀A ∈ A,∀B ∈ neigh(A),∀x, FA,A(x) ≤ FA,B(x)
2. ∀A,B ∈ A,∀x ≥ 1, FA,B(x + 1) − FA,B(x) ≤
FA,B(x)−FA,B(x− 1),
then there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in which
agents choose nodes that constitute an independent set.
Sketch of Proof. This proof proceeds by induction, build-
ing up a Nash equilibrium one agent at a time, and with each
agent making a myopic best response to the previous distribu-
tion. In the case of a single agent, it is clearly an equilibrium
for him to select the best node. Define Di as the distribution
of agents at induction step i. Assume that n − 1 agents have
each selected the best node in turn, resulting in a distribution
Dn−1 which is a Nash equilibrium and also an independent
set. We must show that when an additional agent n chooses
the best node the resulting distribution Dn is still an indepen-
dent set, and still a Nash equilibrium.
First, we show that the new distribution is an independent
set. Assume for the purposes of contradiction that it was best
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for n to choose a node that does not belong to the independent
set. Then it must be the case that the selected node has at
least one neighbor which has been chosen by one or more
other agents. Let the node selected by n be A, and let B
be some neighboring node. From condition 2 in the theorem
(linearity/sublinearity), we can infer that:
FB,B(Dn−1(B) + 1) ≤ FB,B(Dn−1(B)) + FB,B(1) (15)
From condition 1 in the theorem (functional dominance),
we know that:
FB,B(Dn−1(B)) ≤ FB,A(Dn−1(B)) (16)
Thus we can use equation (16) to weaken the bound in
equation (15) to get:
FB,B(Dn−1(B) + 1) ≤ FB,A(Dn−1(B)) + FB,B(1) (17)
Define the utility at inductive step i for an agent taking
action X , and disregarding any local effect from action Y :
U iX,∼Y (z) = FX,X(z) +
∑
W∈neigh(X)|W =Y
FW,X(Di(W )).
At some step i in the induction, Di(B) = 0 and Di(A) =
0, but Di+1(B) = 1. From the fact that the distribution of
agents resulted from myopic choices (stated in the induction
hypothesis), we know that:
FB,B(1) ≤ U iA,∼B(1) (18)
We can use UA,∼B(1) in equation (18) because Di(B) = 0
anyway. From the monotonicity of local-effect functions, and
the fact that i ≤ n we can write:
U iA,∼B(1) ≤ UnA,∼B(1) (19)
We can use equation (19) to weaken the bound given in
equation (18):
FB,B(1) ≤ UnA,∼B(1) (20)
Finally, we can use equation (20) to further weaken the
bound given in equation (17). This gives us:
FB,B(Dn−1(B)+1) ≤ FB,A(Dn−1(B))+UnA,∼B(1) (21)
Equation (21) contradicts our assumption that agent n
would myopically choose A over B; therefore Dn must be
an independent set.
Now we show that D′ is a Nash equilibrium. Let C be
the node that the new agent i selected in making his myopic
response to the distribution D. From symmetry of cost func-
tions we know that no agent can profitably deviate from node
C: if so, i would have chosen a different node in the first
place. Consider an agent j who chose a node V = C. Agent
j’s payoff does not change from distribution D to distribution
D′, because D′ is an independent set, and so FC,V (·) = 0
(there are no local effects between nodes C and V . Since dis-
tribution D was a Nash equilibrium (inductive hypothesis) j
will not deviate from a new distribution D′ that differs only
in that node C is more costly. 
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4 Empirical Findings
Section 3 shows that there are many cases in which local-
effect games have pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Myopic
best response has been shown to be an effective technique
for computing pure strategy equilibria in a variety of settings
[10]. In this section we show that this simple algorithm can
compute pure strategy equilibria for very large local-effect
games that are not covered by any of the positive results
in section 3 and that do not have potential functions. We
present five different graph structures with similar local-effect
functions, and show sample equilibria. We should note that
we have been able to find equilibria experimentally for most
B-LEGs1 with different graph structure and different local-
effect functions that we have tried, and that convergence oc-
curs within a second in most cases. As with our theoretical
results, we do not claim that these equilibria are unique; in-
deed, because agents’ cost functions are symmetric, a new
equilibrium can always be constructed from a given equilib-
rium by swapping action choices between pairs of agents.
Furthermore, we have observed many cases where multiple
structurally different equilibria exist in the same local-effect
game.
All games shown here are B-LEGs with
∀A,∀B FA,B(x) = kA,B log(x + 1). We use one
kn for all node functions and another ke for all edge
functions (i.e., ∀A,∀B = A kA,A = kB,B and
∀A,∀B = A,∀C ∈ {A,B} kA,B = kA,C). We hold
ke = 1 throughout, and vary kn to highlight some of the
more interesting equilibria. These equilibria are represen-
tative of average runs, and were found with a minimum
of parameter manipulation. Each node is labelled with the
number of agents choosing the node in equilibrium. Fig.
1 shows a T structure representative of a simple location
problem. Fig. 2, which we call ‘arbitrary’ in what follows,
1So far, we have only experimented with B-LEGs because undi-
rected local-effect graphs are easier to specify and generate, and be-
cause we consider them to be among the most natural LEGs. We
expect to experiment with other classes of LEGs in our future work.
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is interesting because there are 2 nodes with 2 neighbors, 2
with 3 neighbors and 2 with 4 neighbors. This setting could
represent a role formation game. Fig. 3 shows a binary tree
structure; observe that most agents select leaf nodes because
they have only one neighbor, and thus the parents of leaves
are chosen by few agents. Fig. 4 shows a two-dimensional
grid, representative of our coffee house location problem.
Observe that the corners are most desirable, as they have
only two neighbors; nodes neighboring corners are thus
under-populated, leading to another concentration of agents
in the middle of each edge. It is also interesting that agents
concentrate in the central node, even though it has four neigh-
bors, because its neighbors are relatively under-populated.
Fig. 5 shows what happens to the game from Fig. 4 when we
remove a single node (consider the same location problem
when one node becomes unavailable). Observe that agents
generally cluster around the missing node, except for one
neighboring node that is entirely unpopulated, as a result of
the large local effects acting upon it.
The amount of time it took to reach convergence in each
graph is shown in Fig. 4, starting in each case with a uni-
form distribution of agents across the actions. Finally, since
the ‘arbitrary’ graph in Fig. 2 took the longest to converge
(34% of the agents moved before convergence occurred) we
examine this graph in more detail in Fig. 4. Observe that as
we vary the number of agents, the number of steps required
for convergence increases roughly linearly.
5 Conclusion
Local-effect games exploit context-specific independence be-
tween players’ payoff functions. Finding a potential func-
tion is a good technique for finding equilibria; we identify
all the local-effect games for which potential functions ex-
ist, and provide the potential function in each case. We also
give a positive theoretical result for a broad class of games
that do not have potential functions. Furthermore, we can
show that myopic best response dynamics converge quickly
in other cases which do not have potential functions, and are
also not covered by our positive theoretical results.
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